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Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government
guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking indus-
try. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability
into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses ef-
fort and risk. An overconfident manager overestimates the returns to effort and
risk. We find that managerial overconfidence necessitates an intervention into
banker pay. This is due to the bank’s exploitation of the manager’s overvalua-
tion of bonuses, which causes excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. Moreover, we
show that the optimal bonus tax rises in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives
are sufficiently large. Finally, the model indicates that overconfident managers
are more likely to be found in banks with large government guarantees, low bonus
taxes, and lax capital requirements.
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1 Introduction
Excessive risk-taking in the banking sector played a crucial role in the financial crisis
of 2007-2009. Banks worldwide invested in large stocks of subprime mortgage-backed
securities, which resulted in the bursting of the US housing bubble in the fall of 2007
(see e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Two of the main reasons for excessive risk-taking
in the banking sector - which have so far only been considered independently - are
government guarantees and managerial overconfidence.
In the part of the finance literature assuming perfectly rational agents, government
guarantees are seen as a major cause for excessive risk-taking, as they weaken the
incentive for bank creditors to price in banks’ risk-taking. This lack of market discipline
makes it attractive for shareholders to shift losses to the government. The empirical
relevance of this risk-shifting incentive has been shown repeatedly. In the United States,
for example, financial institutions that had previously received government assistance
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program subsequently shifted to riskier assets (Duchin
and Sosyura, 2014). In Germany, savings banks that had their government guarantees
removed cut their credit risk substantially afterwards (Gropp et al., 2014).
In the behavioral finance literature, overconfident managers are seen as a core reason
for excessive risk-taking.1 Overconfident managers overestimate the expected return
on risky investments, which causes them to take on higher risks (see e.g. Hirshleifer
and Luo, 2001; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Gervais et al., 2011). Overconfidence is
particularly pronounced in complex, high-risk environments with noisy feedback, and
thus under conditions that are vividly present in the banking sector.2 Indeed, there is
comprehensive evidence that banks with overconfident CEOs take on more risk. Banks
governed by overconfident CEOs were more aggressive in lending before the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. During the crisis years, these banks suffered from greater increases
1Moore and Healy (2008) distinguish three notions of overconfidence: overestimation, overplace-
ment, and overprecision. We focus on overconfidence as the manager’s overestimation of the success
probability of his investment. Hence we relate to the empirical literature that investigates the ef-
fects of overconfidence on firm outcomes by using personal portfolios of top managers as a proxy for
overconfidence (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Deshmukh et al., 2013).
2While there is substantial evidence that individuals generally overestimate their own abilities and
talents (e.g. Taylor and Brown (1988)), there are several reasons why bank managers are supposed to
be even more overconfident than the lay population (see Section 2.1 for details). Glaser et al. (2005)
find that professional traders and investment bankers are indeed more overconfident than students.
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in loan defaults, larger declines of stock return performances, and a higher likelihood
of failure than banks managed by non-overconfident CEOs (Ho et al., 2016).3
It is well established that managerial overconfidence and moral hazard arising from
government guarantees are key reasons for excessive risk-taking in the banking industry.
Up to this point, however, it has not been analyzed how overconfidence and government
guarantees interact. It is thus neither clear how to regulate and tax financial markets
that are simultaneously characterized by these two features nor how banks set up
contracts in such an environment. We aim to fill these gaps by incorporating managerial
overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model of the banking
sector. In this setting, we allow the government to optimally set a bonus tax in order to
correct for the inefficiencies resulting from overconfidence and government guarantees.
Our framework is as follows. The model consists of three stages and three players. In the
first stage, the government sets the welfare-maximizing bonus tax. We define welfare
as the weighted sum of the bank’s profit, the manager’s utility, the government’s bonus
tax revenue and bailout costs. Stage 2 turns to the bank’s maximization problem.
The bank chooses the performance-related bonus and the fixed wage that maximize
the bank’s expected after tax profit. In the third stage, the manager decides whether
to accept the bank’s contract. If the manager accepts the contract, he unobservably
chooses the level of effort and the risk of the bank’s investment.
Based on the work of Besley and Ghatak (2013) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2014),
we incorporate two principal-agent problems in our model. The first principal-agent
problem arises between the government and the bank because of government guaran-
tees. Government guarantees imply that the government will step in to partly bail out
external investors if the bank defaults. External investors, knowing that they are paid
even in case of a bank default, do not fully price in the bank’s risk. Hence the bank has
an incentive to induce excessive risk by means of high bonuses in order to draw on the
government guarantees. The second principal-agent problem arises between the bank
and the manager.4 The banker has costs from effort- and risk-taking and thus does
not provide as much effort and risk as desired by the bank. Since the bonus increases
3In addition, banks with overconfident CEOs generally experience higher stock return volatility
(Niu, 2010) and have shown higher real estate loan growth prior to the financial crisis (Ma, 2015).
4Caprio and Levine (2002) highlight two features that differentiate banks from nonfinancial firms.
First, the greater safety net that accompanies banks. And second, the opaqueness of banks, which
amplifies agency problems.
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effort- and risk-taking, the bank can use it to influence both principal-agent problems
to its own advantage.
The other key feature of our model - besides the moral hazard resulting from gov-
ernment guarantees - is managerial overconfidence. Seminal findings in the psychology
literature show that individuals overestimate the probabilities of advantageous events,
especially if the individuals believe to have control over the probabilities of those events
(e.g. Langer, 1975) and if they are highly committed to the outcome (e.g. Weinstein,
1980). We incorporate these findings by modeling overconfidence as an overestimation
of the returns to effort and risk-taking.5 This implies that an overconfident manager
exerts greater effort and risk, increases effort and risk more strongly for a marginal
increase in the bonus, and overvalues the expected utility that he obtains from the
bonus.
Our analysis delivers three main results. First, we derive the optimal bonus tax and
find that it always increases in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are strong.
Government guarantees create an externality of the bank’s behavior on taxpayers,
which is especially attractive for the bank to exploit when the manager is overconfident.
In systemically important financial institutions, it is thus optimal to curb the social
implications of overconfidence with a large bonus tax. In banks that receive a low level of
government guarantees, however, the optimal bonus tax can decrease in overconfidence.
This is because overconfident managers react more elastically to changes in the bonus
and reduce their effort more strongly than rational managers when bonuses are taxed.
Second, we find that managerial overconfidence always necessitates an intervention into
banker pay, even if shareholders fully internalize the externalities of their risk-taking.
Overconfidence creates an incentive for the bank to increase its bonus in order to save
compensation costs, because an overconfident manager overvalues the utility derived
from bonuses. This incentive drives up bonuses and thus causes socially excessive risk-
taking, even if shareholders have no incentive to draw on government guarantees. Unlike
instruments regulating shareholders risk-taking incentives (e.g. capital requirements),
a direct intervention into banker pay (e.g. via bonus taxes or bonus caps) can imple-
ment the socially desirable bonus, because these instruments additionally tackle the
5De la Rosa (2011) gives an overview of the literature which indicates that agents overestimate their
return to effort. Our assumption that overconfident managers overestimate the return to risk-taking
is backed up by several finance studies that suggest overconfident CEOs have a higher tendency to
undertake risky projects (e.g. Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2016; Niu, 2010).
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inefficiencies arising from the manager’s overvaluation of the bonus.
Third, we find that overconfident bankers and banks with large government guarantees
match in equilibrium. As banks with larger government guarantees benefit more from
inducing excessive risk-taking by the manager, these banks also benefit more from hir-
ing an overconfident manager. The selection of overconfident managers into banks that
receive large bailout subsidies has substantial implications for taxpayers. It leads to a
high default risk of these banks and causes large expected bailout costs for taxpayers.
We argue that direct interventions into banker pay (e.g. a bonus tax or cap) are par-
ticularly suited to avoid the matching between overconfident managers and banks with
large government guarantees. This is because banker pay interventions not only tackle
risk-shifting incentives but also make it more costly for shareholders to exploit man-
agerial overvaluation. Taken as a whole, the three main results of our paper suggest
that the presence of managerial overconfidence calls for bonus taxes in systemically
important financial institutions. Bonus taxation can curb the bank’s risk-shifting in-
centives, deter the exploitation of managerial overvaluation, and avoid the selection of
overconfident managers into systemically important financial institutions.
Our paper relates to the literature on the optimal taxation and regulation of banker
compensation. Besley and Ghatak (2013) examine the optimal tax-scheme for banker
compensation in financial markets that are characterized by government guarantees.
They find that this optimal tax-scheme is progressive in the size of the government
guarantee and can increase both equity and efficiency. Investigating the international
competition for bank managers, Gietl and Haufler (2018) find that there can be either
a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to the top’ in bonus taxation when managers are mo-
bile across countries and banks are protected by government guarantees. Hakenes and
Schnabel (2014) and Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) investigate non-tax regulatory
measures. Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) find that bonus caps are welfare-increasing for
sufficiently large bailout expectations, because they curb the ability for banks to induce
excessive risk. Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) show that a combination of clawback
rules and restrictions on the curvature of pay can induce an executive to implement
socially optimal risk choices. While these papers look at the optimal taxation and reg-
ulation, respectively, of compensation in the presence of government guarantees, they
do assume fully rational bankers. Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by
investigating how taxation and regulation have to adapt when bankers are not fully
rational but overconfident.
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A second important strand of literature concerns the effects of managerial overcon-
fidence. Following the seminal paper of Malmendier and Tate (2005), an influential
literature investigating the effects of managerial overconfidence on firm outcomes has
emerged.6 Empirical evidence shows that firms can benefit from CEO overconfidence,
for example because overconfident CEOs capitalize on innovative growth opportunities
better (Hirshleifer et al., 2012) and because firms can exploit the managerial overval-
uation of incentive pay to lower compensation costs (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016).7
Overconfident CEOs, however, can also reduce shareholder value by engaging in value
destroying investments and mergers (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). While this literature
focuses on the impact of overconfidence on firm outcomes, we show how managerial
overconfidence affects government policies.
We also contribute to the literature on the matching between overconfident managers
and firm characteristics. Gervais et al. (2011) analyze how compensation contracts
optimally adapt to managerial overconfidence.8 The authors find that, in equilibrium,
overconfident managers are selected into risky, undiversified growth firms. Graham
et al. (2013) show empirically that there is indeed a positive relationship between
CEO overconfidence and growth firms. Beyond that, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that
firms in innovative industries are more likely to be run by overconfident CEOs. Our
paper shows that overconfident managers may also match according to the regulatory
environment faced by banks, and are more likely to be found in banks with large
government guarantees, low bonus taxes, and lax capital requirements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup of our three-
stage model. Section 3 analyzes the effort- and risk-taking decisions of rational and
overconfident managers. Section 4 investigates the maximization problem of the bank
as well as the bank’s optimal contract for the manager. Section 5 sets up our welfare
function and derives the optimal bonus tax. Section 6 shows why overconfidence ne-
cessitates an intervention into banker pay. Section 7 investigates the competition for
overconfident managers. Section 8 discusses several policy implications before Section 9
concludes.
6See Malmendier and Tate (2015) for an overview.
7De la Rosa (2011) and Gervais et al. (2011) show theoretically that firms have an incentive to
exploit the managerial overvaluation of incentive pay.
8There is indeed evidence that firms adjust their contracts to managerial overconfidence. For in-




The bank in our model is a financial intermediary, which is financed through equity and
deposits.9 We assume that the share of deposit financing is exogenously determined,
for example by binding capital requirements. The depositors demand a fixed expected
return for their deposits. In case of a bank default they are partly insured by the
government (see below).
Assets: The bank’s assets are normalized to 1 and consist of a risky portfolio. This
portfolio can realize a high, a medium, or a low return (Y h > Y m > Y l = 0). These
investment returns are exogenous and publicly observable. The corresponding prob-
abilities of the returns (ph > 0, pm > 0, and pl = 1 − ph − pm > 0), however, are
endogenously determined by the unobservable decisions of the manager on effort e and
risk-taking b.
Following Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), we assume that the probabilities of the exoge-
nous returns are linear functions of the manager’s effort and risk-taking choices:
ph = αe+ βb,
pm = pm0 − b, (1)
pl = pl0 − αe+ (1− β)b.
Effort e increases the mean return of the portfolio as it shifts probability mass from pl
to ph. Risk-taking b is modelled as a mean-preserving spread. It shifts probability mass
from pm to both pl and ph. Taking effort and risk involves private, non-monetary costs
for the manager.10 For simplicity, we assume that these cost functions are quadratic.








These private costs, along with non-observable effort and risk-taking choices by the
manager, cause moral hazard problems between the manager and the bank. Specifically,
9For brevity, we call these units banks. However, our model generally also applies to non-bank fi-
nancial intermediaries which are characterized by government guarantees and strong agency problems.
10As in Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), b = 0 can be interpreted as the natural risk-level. Raising
risk beyond this natural risk-level (i.e., choosing b > 0) causes private costs as the manager has to
actively search for riskier investments or to move into new asset classes. Hence the parameter b can
be seen as the effort to increase the risk level beyond its natural level, whereas the parameter e can
be interpreted as the productive effort that increases the mean-return of the portfolio.
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the manager exerts less effort and risk-taking than desired by the bank. The bank can
mitigate this principal-agent problem by paying a bonus z if the high return Y h is
realized, which incentivizes the manager to increase effort and risk. In addition to the
bonus payment z, the bank can pay a fixed wage F that is independent of the realized
return.
Government guarantees: As deposits are partly insured, a second principal agent prob-
lem arises between the government and the bank. In the case of bank default, Y l, the
government partly bails out depositors. This assumption is motivated by the presence
of deposit insurance in essentially all developed countries.11 The partially insured in-
vestors do not fully price in the default probability of the bank, which enables the bank
to shift losses to the government. Hence, the bank has an incentive to use the bonus z
to incentivize the manager to take on excessive risk at the expense of the government.12
The government is aware of this risk-shifting problem and uses bonus taxation to
correct the bank’s distorted incentives. Our baseline model focuses on this policy in-
strument, as the bonus tax not only acts as a Pigovian tax, but also redistributes from
the financial sector to taxpayers. This redistributive aspect reflects the goal of many
governments to get the financial sector to ”make a fair and substantial contribution
toward paying for any burden associated with government interventions to repair the
banking system” (International Monetary Fund, 2010). A bonus cap, as an alternative
measure to intervene in banker pay, will be discussed in Section 6.1.
2.1 Overconfidence
As managerial overconfidence is an integral part of our analysis, this subsection mo-
tivates and explains our modelling of overconfidence. In our model, an overconfident
manager overestimates his skills and thus overestimates the returns to effort and risk-
11Barth et al. (2006) provide an overview of deposit insurance schemes and discuss their welfare
effects. A more complex model would motivate the existence of deposit insurance as a means to avoid
bank runs when banks engage in maturity transformation (cf. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). We,
however, focus on the principal agent problems that characterize the banking industry and thus follow
the dominant approach in the literature (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2013; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2014)
and assume government guarantees to be exogenously given.
12This argument illustrates why the bank does not pay a bonus in the medium state, Ym. A bonus in
the medium state would reduce the manager’s risk-taking incentives and thus lower the bank’s profits
derived from the government guarantee.
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taking. The psychology literature shows that individuals generally overestimate their
own abilities and talents (see Taylor and Brown (1988) for a review) and the probabili-
ties of advantageous events (e.g. Langer (1975)). As Taylor and Brown (1988) conclude:
”A great deal of research in social, personality, clinical, and developmental psychology
documents that normal individuals possess unrealistically positive views of themselves
[and] an exaggerated belief in their ability to control the environment”.
There are several reasons why top bank managers are likely to be more overconfident
than the lay population. First, successful bankers are likely to become overconfident
due to the self-attribution bias. Top bankers have experienced success in their careers.
As individuals generally overestimate the extent to which they have contributed to
their own success (Langer, 1975), successful bankers and traders are especially prone
to becoming overconfident (see e.g. Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001).13
Second, selection effects may imply that overconfident individuals are more likely to
become top bankers than non-overconfident people. For example, overconfident indi-
viduals overestimate the expected value of performance pay and thus self select into
jobs with high performance pay such as banking. Finally, Goel and Thakor (2008) show
that if firms promote based on the best performances, then overconfident managers are
more likely to be promoted as they take on larger risks.14
Due to the manager overestimating the returns to effort and risk-taking, the probabil-
ities as perceived by an overconfident manager differ from the actual probabilities. We
denote parameters as perceived by an overconfident manager with a hat. The proba-
bilities as considered by the manager are given by
p̂h = (1 + θ)(αe+ βb),
p̂m = pm0 − b, (3)
p̂l = pl0 − (1 + θ)αe+ b[1− β(1 + θ)],
The parameter θ in eq. (3) measures the level of overconfidence. For θ = 0 the manager
is rational and evaluates the probabilities correctly as in eq. (1). For θ > 0, however, the
13If agents receive negative (but unbiased) noisy feedback on their own performance, however, then
they attribute the negative feedback to being unlucky (i.e., they think their feedback underrepresents
their individual performance), as shown by Grossman and Owens (2012).
14First evidence confirms that top bankers are indeed more overconfident than the general popu-
lation. Using questionnaires and experiments, Glaser et al. (2005) find that professional traders and
investment bankers are more overconfident than students. Graham et al. (2013) examine psychometric
tests and conclude that CEOs are more optimistic than the general population.
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manager overestimates the probability of the high state (p̂h > ph) and underestimates
the default probability (p̂l < pl). Our analysis will show that overconfidence affects the
bank’s optimal bonus and fixed wage, and thus critically influences the principal agent
problems both between the bank and the manager, and between the government and
the bank.
In the following sections we analyze our sequential three-stage model. In Stage 1, the
government sets its welfare-maximizing bonus tax t. In Stage 2, the bank chooses the
profit-maximizing bonus z and fixed wage F . Stage 3 analyzes the decisions of the
manager. The manager chooses whether to accept the bank’s contract based on his
perceived expected utility. If the manager accepts the contract, he decides on the levels
of effort and risk. We proceed to solve our model by backward induction.
3 Stage 3: Manager’s choices and perceived utility
In Stage 3, the government has set its bonus tax t and the bank has chosen the man-
ager’s contract (z and F ). Given his contract, the manager maximizes his perceived
expected utility. For an overconfident manager the perceived expected utility deviates
from his actual expected utility as he misjudges the probabilities of the exogenous
returns.
The risk-neutral manager receives the bonus z if and only if state h occurs.15 On top of
that, he obtains the fixed wage F in any state. The perceived expected utility is given
by







Eq. (4) shows that the perceived expected utility depends positively on the manager’s
estimate of the success probability [p̂h = (αe+ βb)(1 + θ)], the bonus z, and the fixed













15Thanassoulis (2012) reviews the literature on risk preferences of bankers and finds that bankers






Hence both the manager’s effort level e and the risk level b increase in the level of
overconfidence θ and the bonus payment z. Note that the manager’s optimal effort and
risk level do not depend on the fixed wage F .










z(1 + θ) ≡ γz(1 + θ),
pm∗ = pm0 −
β
µ
z(1 + θ), (7)








z(1 + θ) ≡ pl0 + δz(1 + θ).
A higher bonus leads to more effort and risk-taking, which both unambiguously increase
ph. The sign of δ in eq. (7) determines whether the marginal effect of the bonus on
the low return probability pl is positive or negative. On the one hand, a higher bonus
induces more risk-taking, which increases δ and thus also pl. On the other hand, a
higher bonus leads to more effort, which reduces δ and therefore pl. In what follows, we
assume that δ > 0, implying that the risk effect of the bonus dominates the effort effect
and a higher bonus increases the bank’s default probability pl.16 The effect of the bonus
on the medium return is unambiguously negative, as the bonus shifts probability mass
away from the medium state to incentivize risk-taking. Note that an increase in over-
confidence amplifies the marginal effects of the bonus on the equilibrium probabilities
as overconfidence increases the marginal effect of the bonus on effort- and risk-taking.
The equilibrium probabilities are independent of the fixed wage.





(1 + θ)2z2 + F. (8)
This shows that both a higher bonus and a higher fixed wage increase the perceived
utility. An overconfident manager (θ > 0) overvalues the influence of the bonus on his
utility as he overestimates the likelihood of receiving the bonus (p̂h > ph).
16This is in line with Efing et al. (2015), who find that pre-crisis incentive pay was positively
correlated with the volatility of bank-trading income and too high to maximize the banks’ Sharpe
ratio.
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4 Stage 2: Bank’s bonus and fixed wage decisions
In Stage 2, we turn to the bank and its behavior. In Section 4.1 we look at the bank’s
financing constraint and how it is influenced by government guarantees and overconfi-
dence. Section 4.2 derives and discusses the bank’s optimal contract (z and F ).
4.1 The financing constraint
The bank is financed by a share 1−s of equity and a share s of deposits (s ∈ [0; 1]). The
share of deposits is determined by an exogenous minimum capital requirement. As the
bank prefers deposits over equity due to the deposit insurance, the capital requirement
is always binding. The risk-neutral depositors demand an expected return of d per unit
of deposits. As the bank’s asset volume is normalized to 1, depositors thus demand
a total return of sd. We assume that, if the returns Y h or Y m are realized, the bank
is able to repay the depositors an agreed return s(d + X), where X is the additional
unit return the depositors require in order to be compensated for their potential loss
in state l. If the bank defaults (Y l = 0), then the bank cannot repay the depositors.
Instead the government pays an exogenous share vi ∈ [0; 1] of sd to the depositors of
bank i. This share vi can be interpreted as the level of government guarantees that
bank i receives. The financing constraint is then given by
(1− pl)s(d+X) + plvisd = sd. (9)
Solving for X, we obtain
X =
dpl(1− vi)
1− pl . (10)
Eq. (10) shows that the higher is the government guarantee vi, the smaller is the
extent as to which the default probability of the bank, pl, is priced in by depositors. If
depositors are completely insured by the government (i.e., vi = 1), they do not price
in the default risk at all (X = 0), because the depositors receive their full repayment
even in the case of bank default.
Note that the default probability pl depends positively on the level of overconfidence θ
(see eq.(7)). An overconfident manager takes on more risk, which increases the likeli-
hood that the bank does not pay back depositors. The lower the government guarantee,
the more strongly depositors price in the overconfidence of the manager.
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4.2 The contract
The expected bank profit is given by
Π = ph∗[Y h − z(1 + t)− s(d+X)] + pm∗[Y m − s(d+X)]− F − (1− s)d. (11)
Eq. (11) shows that the expected bank profit consists of the state-specific profit of
the bank in the high and the medium state (weighted by the respective equilibrium
probabilities), minus the fixed wage and the opportunity costs of shareholders. If the
bank realizes Y h, it pays s(d + X) to its depositors, the net bonus z to its manager,
and bonus taxes tz to the government. In state m, the bank receives a portfolio return
of Y m and pays back s(d+X) to depositors.
If the bank obtains the low return Y l = 0, then it does not pay back depositors. In this
case the payments to depositors are partially covered by the deposit insurance, which
does not enter the bank’s profit expression. As the fixed wage F is paid by the bank in
all states, bank’s shareholders realize a loss in the case of default.17 Finally, the term
(1− s)d gives the opportunity costs of shareholders. This is the product of the share of
equity financing (1− s) and the rate of return, which we assume to equal the expected
unit return of depositors, d.
The bank sets the bonus z and the fixed wage F to maximize its expected after-tax
profits. We assume that the bank needs the manager to run the bank and that it is
thus always in the bank’s best interest to hire the manager.
Substituting the financing constraint in (10) into (11), the bank’s maximization prob-
lem is given by
max
z,F
Π = ph∗[Y h − z(1 + t)] + pm∗Y m − F − (1− s)d+ pl∗visd− sd
s.t. ph∗ = γz(1 + θ)








(1 + θ)2z2 + F ≥ ū. (12)
The bank’s maximization problem in eq. (12) effectively has three constraints: the fi-
nancing constraint, the incentive constraint, and the participation constraint. First, the
17We thus assume that the bank’s equity can cover the fixed wage, F < (1− s)d.
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financing constraint implies that the bank has to ensure that depositors invest in the
bank. As the depositors are partly insured by the government and do not accurately
price in the bank’s default risk, the bank derives a subsidy pl∗visd from the govern-
ment guarantee. Second, the incentive constraint implies that the bank has to take
into account that the equilibrium probabilities are affected by the bonus z. A higher
bonus increases effort and risk-taking of the manager, which increases ph∗ and pl∗ and
decreases pm∗. And third, the participation constraint implies that the manager’s per-
ceived expected utility of the bank’s contract must be at least as large as the manager’s
fixed outside utility (ū). Otherwise the manager will not accept the contract.
We restrict our analysis to the case where both the bonus z and the fixed wage F are
used in equilibrium, which is the case generally observed for senior managers.18 The
fixed wage is only used to satisfy the banker’s participation constraint(cf. eq. (12)).
We assume that for all possible levels of bonus taxes (i.e., t ≥ 0), the condition for the
fixed wage to be used holds. This condition is derived in Appendix A and given by










First, (13) rules out the case where the manager is so overconfident that the bonus is
too attractive for the bank to pay a positive fixed wage. And second, the condition also
ensures that the utility of the manager’s outside option, ū, is sufficiently large for the
fixed wage to be used.






Y h(1 + θ)− 2(1 + t)γz(1 + θ) + δvisd(1 + θ) + γz(1 + θ)2 = 0. (14)
An increase in the bonus has four effects on the bank’s profit. First, the bonus increases
effort-taking of the manager, which increases the mean return of the bank’s portfolio.
Second, the monetary bonus costs of the bank rise. Third, the bonus increases risk-
taking of the manager, which shifts the costs of repaying depositors to the government.
And fourth, the bonus reduces the fixed wage that is necessary for the bank to fulfill the
participation constraint of the manager. Importantly, this effect is especially strong for
an overconfident manager. Intuitively, as the overconfident manager overestimates the
18For bankers earning more than 1 million euros in EU banks, for example, the average ratio between
variable and fixed pay was 104% in 2016 (European Banking Authority, 2018).
19See Appendix A for the detailed solution of the bank’s maximization problem in eq. (12).
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probability of obtaining the bonus (p̂h > ph), he also overvalues the expected utility he
derives from the bonus. This overvaluation creates the possibility for the bank to lower
its expected compensation costs at the expense of the biased manager by increasing
the bonus and lowering the fixed wage.20
The bank’s profit-maximizing bonus zB increases in the marginal profit of a costless








,where Ω ≡ α
2
η
Y h + δvisd > 0 and Ψ ≡ γ[2(1 + t)− (1 + θ)] > 0.
(15)
A costless bonus increases the banker’s effort and risk-taking, which raises the prob-
ability of realizing the high return, and the probability to draw on the government
guarantee. The higher are the bank’s risk-shifting incentives (δvisd), the higher is the
bank’s bonus. The marginal net costs of the bonus, (1 + θ)Ψ, are the marginal bonus
costs of the bank (which rise in the bonus tax t) minus the bank’s marginal savings on
the fixed wage.21 These marginal savings stem from the fact that a higher bonus re-
duces the fixed wage that is necessary to fulfill the manager’s participation constraint.
Note that the savings are larger for an overconfident manager, as he overvalues the
utility that he derives from the bonus and is therefore willing to accept a lower fixed
wage. The assumption in (13) ensure that 2− (1 + θ) > 0 and thus that the net costs
are positive (Ψ > 0).








The fixed wage FB rises in the utility of the manager’s outside option and falls in the
manager’s level of overconfidence. The latter is due to overconfidence making the bonus
relatively more attractive (substitution effect) and lowering the overall compensation
20Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that firms exploit overconfident CEO’s
overvaluation of incentive pay in order to lower compensation costs. The incentive to exploit managerial
overvaluation has also been derived theoretically by De la Rosa (2011) and Gervais et al. (2011).
21The bonus tax thus always reduces the bonus in our model. Dietl et al. (2013) show that it can
be optimal for a principal to increase bonuses as a response to a bonus tax, if an agent is highly
risk-averse. The literature on banker’s risk preferences, however, shows that banker’s are very mildly
risk averse or even risk neutral (see Thanassoulis (2012)).
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needed for satisfying the manager’s participation constraint (income effect). A bonus
tax increases the fixed wage as it reduces the bonus zB.
To sum up, the more overconfident the manager, the higher is the bonus that he
receives and the lower is his fixed wage. First, this is due to the overconfident manager
increasing his effort- and risk-taking more for a given increase in the bonus than a
rational manager. And second, an overconfident manager overvalues the bonus. Hence
bonuses become more attractive for the bank as they can be used to exploit the manager
and lower compensation costs. We also find that the bonus increases in the level of the
government guarantee. This is because the government guarantee makes risk-taking
more attractive, which can be induced with bonuses.
5 Stage 1: The government
In this section we look at the role of the government. In Section 5.1 we define and
discuss the welfare function. Section 5.2 derives the optimal bonus tax and discusses
its properties.
5.1 The welfare function
The government maximizes welfare with respect to the bonus tax t. Bonus taxation can
be used to redistribute from the financial sector to taxpayers. Moreover, the bonus tax
affects the manager’s effort and risk-taking choices in equilibrium. As the government
guarantee leads to diverging interests between the bank and the government, the risk-
reducing effect of the bonus tax is a valuable Pigouvian tool to decrease the likelihood
of bailouts.
Our social welfare function takes into account the bank’s profit Π∗ in eq. (12) and the





.22 Additionally, the social
welfare function entails the government’s bailout costs, B, and its bonus tax income
22For the actual expected utility, the utility derived from the bonus is weighted by the actual
probability of the bonus ph in eq. (7) and not by the perceived probability p̂h as in the perceived
utility in eq. (4). This is because the actual outcome of the manager is determined by ph and not by
his biased beliefs p̂h.
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The bailout costs are given by
B = pl∗visd =
[
pl0 + δzB(1 + θ)
]
visd. (17)
Note that eq. (17) implies that overconfidence increases the likelihood of bailouts, pl∗,
for two reasons. First, for a given contract, overconfident managers take on more risk
as they overestimate the success probability of risky investments. And secondly, the
bank creates higher powered compensation contracts for overconfident managers, which
amplifies the behavioral effects of overconfidence and increases risk-taking further. As
overconfidence raises the likelihood of bailouts, it increases the transfer of taxpayer
money to the bank.
The tax revenue T is given by
T = tph∗zB = t(1 + θ)γz
2
B. (18)
Hence overconfident managers create larger tax revenues, as they generate higher ex-
pected bonus payments, ph∗zB. First, overconfident managers receive a higher bonus.
And secondly, they take on more effort and risk, which lead to a higher probability of
the bonus being paid, ph∗. Hence with respect to the tax revenue, the government can
benefit from overconfident managers as they generate more bonus tax income.
We normalize the welfare weights of the banker and the shareholders to 1 and weigh
the bailout costs B and the tax revenue T by λ. We argue that a monetary unit in
the pocket of the government is worth more than a monetary unit for the bank or the
banker (i.e., λ > 1). This is due to the marginal costs of public funds, which are the
loss of society that the government causes when it raises additional revenues to finance
its spending (see e.g. Browning (1976)).24
Substituting the bank profit from eq. (12), our welfare function is thus given by
W = Π∗ + u+ λ(T − B)






+ λ(tph∗zB − pl∗visd). (19)
23The risk-neutral depositors always receive an expected return of sd independent of the bonus tax.
Their payoffs are thus not included explicitly in our welfare function.
24The higher weight of tax income and bailout costs in our welfare function can also be explained
by a preference for redistribution from banker income and bank profits to taxpayers.
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The welfare function can be subdivided into three parts. First, the first five terms in
the second line of eq. (19) capture the bank’s profit net of the bank’s payments to
the banker (cf. eq (12)). Note that the expected bonus payments ph∗z and the fixed
wage F are simply transfers from the bank to the banker and therefore do not directly
affect welfare in eq. (19). Second, the behavioral costs of the manager (i.e., the effort-






) lower welfare, because they reduce the manager’s
utility.
Finally, the government’s net revenue (i.e., tax revenue minus bailout costs) is shown in
the third line of eq. (19). The government’s net revenue is positive, if the tax revenue
dominates the bailout costs. It is also possible, however, that the expected bailout
costs B dominate the tax revenue T , which implies a negative net revenue for the
government. This is the case when the exogenous default probability of the bank pl0 is
large and when the level of government guarantees vi is high.
5.2 The optimal bonus tax
We now proceed to derive the optimal bonus tax t∗. Substituting eqs. (5), (6), (7) into
eq. (19) and differentiating the welfare function with respect to t gives
∂W
∂t




















On the one hand, a bonus tax lowers the mean return of the bank’s investment due





< 0). On the other hand, the bonus
tax has several positive welfare implications. First, it reduces the manager’s effort
and risk-taking costs (−γ(1 + θ)zB ∂zB∂t > 0). Second, the bonus tax redistributes from
the financial sector to the government. Note that the tax revenue is especially high for
overconfident managers as they receive a higher bonus z and take on more effort and risk
for a given bonus. Finally, the bonus tax reduces the net bailout costs, (λ−1)pl∗visd, as
it lowers risk-taking incentives. This is particularly desirable when banks receive large
government guarantees and employ overconfident managers.
Whether the bonus tax is used in equilibrium is determined by the first order condition








{[2− (1 + θ)][2λδvisd+ (λ− 1)Ω] + 4θΩ} > 0. (21)
Eq. (21) shows that the first marginal unit of bonus tax always increases welfare. The
bonus tax lowers the bank’s profit. At t = 0 this negative welfare effect is always
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dominated by the positive effects, namely the reduction of bailout costs, the increase
in tax revenue, and the reduction of the manager’s effort and risk costs.
We now investigate the condition for the bonus tax to be finite. In Appendix B we show
that ∂W
∂t





(λ−1) . Hence if the risk-shifting incentives,
δvisd, are very large, then the government optimally sets t
∗ → ∞ in order to minimize






λ− 1 , (22)
then there is an interior solution for t∗ (see Appendix B).
Setting the first order condition in eq. (20) equal to zero, we get the optimal interior
bonus tax
t∗ =
[2− (1 + θ)][(λ− 1)Ω + 2λδvisd] + 4θΩ
2[(λ+ 1)Ω− 2λδvisd]
. (23)
Note that the condition for the interior solution in eq. (22) implies that the denominator
of the optimal bonus tax in eq. (23) is always positve.
We can now use comparative statics for eq. (23) to analyze the properties of the optimal




4δsd{λ2[2− (1 + θ)]α2
η
Y h + (λ− 1)θΩ}
2 [(λ+ 1)Ω− 2λδvisd]2
> 0. (24)
Eq. (24) shows that the bonus tax increases in the level of bailout guarantees vi.
The larger the bailout guarantees, the stronger the risk-taking incentives of the bank,
because depositors price in the bank’s risk-taking to a smaller extent. Hence bailout
guarantees make the bonus tax more attractive, as the tax curbs the bank’s excessive
risk-taking.
The effect of a tightening of capital requirements on the optimal bonus tax is given by
∂t∗
∂(1− s) =
−4δvid{λ2[2− (1 + θ)]α
2
η
Y h + (λ− 1)θΩ}
2 [(λ+ 1)Ω− 2λδvisd]2
< 0. (25)
Tighter capital requirements (i.e., larger 1− s) reduce the leverage of the bank, which
implies that the bank can shift fewer costs onto the government. This decreases the
marginal benefit of the tax that arises from reducing the bailout costs. Hence capital
requirements and bonus taxes are strategic substitutes.
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For a rational manager (θ = 0), an increase in the weight of the government’s net
revenue λ always raises the optimal bonus tax t∗. This is because a higher tax reduces
the government’s bailout costs and can raise tax revenue, while it hurts the bank’s
profits.
If the manager is overconfident (θ > 0), the effect of λ on the optimal tax depends on
the strength of the bank’s risk-shifting incentives. If the bank’s risk-shifting incentives
are strong (i.e., δvisd is large and
α2
η
Y h is low), then the optimal tax rises in λ, as it
becomes increasingly important for the government to reduce its bailout costs.
If the risk-shifting incentives are weak (i.e., δvisd is small and
α2
η
Y h is large), however,
a net revenue maximizing government is mainly concerned with the bonus tax revenue
the manager generates. In this case, the government maximizes welfare by setting a
low bonus tax for an overconfident banker, as the effort of an overconfident manager
reacts especially elastically to the bonus tax. This is because overconfident managers
overestimate the likelihood of obtaining the bonus, and thus react more elastically to
changes in the bonus (cf. the optimal effort in eq. (5)). Hence (26) shows that if the
manager is sufficiently overconfident and risk-shifting incentives are low, an increase in
λ can actually lower the optimal bonus tax, because the government does not want to
distort the especially elastic effort of an overconfident manager.
Finally, we investigate how the optimal bonus tax depends on overconfidence. Differ-





2 [(λ+ 1)Ω− 2λδvisd]
. (27)
If the bank’s risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently strong (δvisd > 3
α2
η
Y h), then over-
confidence always increases the optimal bonus tax t∗, as shown in Appendix C.25 An
overconfident manager overestimates the returns to risk. Hence managerial overconfi-
dence makes it cheaper for the bank to induce risk-shifting and to draw on the bailout
25Appendix C shows that the condition δvisd > 3
α2
η
Y h does not preclude an interior equilibrium
for the bonus tax.
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subsidy. These risk-shifting incentives are socially undesirable and can be mitigated
with a larger bonus tax.26
In other words, overconfidence mitigates the principal-agent problem between the bank
and the manager as it becomes cheaper for shareholders to align the manager’s behavior
with the bank’s objective. This is detrimental for welfare, however, if risk-shifting
incentives are strong, because it becomes easier for the bank to exploit the government
subsidy. Hence the principal-agent problem between government and bank becomes
more severe in the presence of overconfidence, and the government optimally sets a
higher bonus tax in order to align the bank’s with the government’s interests.
Appendix C shows that a negative effect of overconfidence on the optimal bonus tax




and the weight of the government’s net revenue is large (λ > 5).27 In this case the
government mainly aims to maximize its bonus tax revenue T . As an overconfident
manager’s effort reacts more elastically to changes in the bonus, the government then
optimally sets a lower bonus tax for an overconfident banker.
We summarize our main results of Section 5 in
Proposition 1 Optimal bonus tax
If eq. (22) holds, then
(i) the welfare-maximizing bonus tax t∗ is given in eq. (23).
(ii) t∗ always increases in the level of overconfidence θ, if the risk-shifting incentives




Proofs: Appendices B and C.
The key finding in Proposition 1 is that the optimal bonus tax always increases in
overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently strong. This is particularly the
case for systemically important financial institutions as they receive bailout subsidies
through both explicit and implicit government guarantees. These guarantees create an
externality of the bank’s behavior on taxpayers, which is especially attractive to exploit
26It is also easy to see from eq. (27) that overconfidence always increases the optimal tax for a
sufficiently low weight of the government’s net revenue (λ < 5
3
).
27This is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the effect of overconfidence on the optimal
bonus tax to be negative (see Appendix C).
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if the manager is overconfident. In systemically important financial institutions, it is
thus optimal to curb the social implications of overconfidence with a higher bonus tax.
Recent evidence shows that managerial overconfidence indeed not only affects firm
outcomes, but also causes substantial externalities. Banks with overconfident CEOs
generally experience higher stock return volatility (Niu, 2010) and have shown higher
real estate loan growth prior to the financial crisis (Ma, 2015). During the recent
financial crises, banks managed by CEOs suffered from greater increases in loan defaults
and a higher likelihood of failure than banks governed by non-overconfident CEOs (Ho
et al., 2016). Due to the large externalities on taxpayers caused by banks’ risk-taking
and failures, it is necessary for the government to counteract the adverse effects arising
from overconfidence in the banking industry. In the following section we discuss why the
bonus tax is better suited to do so than other instruments (e.g. capital requirements).
6 Do we need to intervene in banker pay?
Following the financial crisis of 2007-2009 a lively discussion has emerged about whether
or not the government should intervene in banker pay. We shed light on the role of man-
agerial overconfidence in this debate in the following. To do so, Section 6.1 derives the
socially optimal bonus and compares it to the bonus set by the bank. Section 6.2 then
uses the example of capital requirements to illustrate why the socially optimal bonus
cannot be obtained without interventions in banker pay, if bankers are overconfident.
6.1 The socially optimal contract
In this section we derive the socially optimal bonus when the government does not
directly intervene in the banker’s compensation (i.e., t = 0). We then compare this
bonus to the one chosen by the bank.
In Appendix D we maximize the welfare function in eq. (19) with respect to the bonus,










We can now investigate how the bank’s bonus in eq. (15) deviates from the socially
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optimal bonus, if the government does not intervene into banker pay:
zB|t=0 − zS|t=0 =
[2− (1 + θ)]λδvisd+ 2θΩ
γ[(1 + θ)][2− (1 + θ)] > 0. (29)
The bonus chosen by the bank is unambiguously larger than the socially optimal
bonus.28 The bank does not internalize the bailout costs of the government. Hence
it prefers more risk, which can be induced with a higher bonus. Moreover, the bank
exploits the managerial overvaluation, which leads to the manager providing too much
effort and risk relative to the actual probability of getting the bonus.
Note that an upper bound for bonuses, a bonus cap, set at zS|t=0 can implement the
socially optimal bonus. The cap has the same qualitative behavioral effects as the bonus
tax discussed in Section 5.2, because it also lowers the bonus and raises the fixed wage.
A bonus cap, however, does not raise tax revenue, which is an attractive channel to
redistribute from the financial sector to the government. Hence in a setting where the
marginal costs of public funds exceed one (λ > 1), the optimal bonus tax dominates
the optimal bonus cap with respect to welfare.
6.2 Capital requirements
This section investigates, if capital requirements can implement the socially optimal
bonus. To see if an increase in the capital requirements, 1− s, brings the bank bonus
closer to the social optimum, we derive eq. (29) with respect to (1− s):
∂(zB|t=0 − zS|t=0 )
∂(1− s) = −
λδvid[2− (1 + θ)] + 2δvidθ
γ(1 + θ)[2− (1 + θ)] < 0. (30)
Eq. (30) implies that tighter capital requirements indeed reduce the gap between the
bank’s bonus and the socially optimal bonus. With tighter capital requirements, the
bank internalizes the downside risk of its investment to a larger extent and thus has a
smaller incentive to induce risk-taking via bonuses. Whether capital requirements can
actually establish the socially optimal bonus is determined by
lim
(1−s)→1





γ(1 + θ)[2− (1 + θ)] > 0. (31)
Eq. (31) shows that capital requirements alone cannot implement the socially desir-
able bonus level, if the manager is overconfident (θ > 0). Even in the extreme case
28The fixed wage chosen by the bank, FB , is smaller than the socially optimal fixed wage, which is
given by FS = ū− γ2 (1 + θ)2z2S .
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with capital requirements approaching 100%, the bank’s bonus is higher than socially
optimal.29
Recall from Section 6.1 that there are two reasons why the bank’s bonus is higher than
the socially optimal bonus. First, the bank uses the bonus to maximize its value of
the government subsidy. Capital requirements can tackle this problem, as they force
the bank to internalize the externalities of its risk-taking. And second, the bank sets
an excessively high bonus in order to exploit the manager, if he is overconfident. An
overconfident manager overvalues the utility that he derives from a bonus, because he
overestimates the probability to obtain the bonus (p̂h > ph). Hence, for an overconfident
manager, the bank can save compensation costs by offering a higher bonus and a lower
fixed wage. This higher bonus has the side effect that risk-taking is greater (see eq.
(6)) than under the socially optimal bonus. Capital requirements cannot tackle the
inefficiencies arising from the exploitation of managerial overvaluation.
For a rational manager (θ = 0), capital requirements can establish the socially optimal
bonus (cf. eq. (31)), as there is no possibility for the bank to exploit the manager. Unlike
an overconfident manager, a rational manager derives the same perceived utility from
one dollar of expected bonus payments as from one dollar of fixed wage.
Moving away from capital requirements and generalizing our argument, Appendix E
derives the bank’s bonus zR|t=0 under the assumption that regulation achieves that
the bank fully internalizes the bailout costs of the government (λpl∗visd). Analogously
to the capital requirements, the bank’s bonus is higher than socially optimal, if the
manager is overconfident. In the presence of overconfidence, curbing shareholders’ risk-
shifting incentives alone is not enough, as the bank has an incentive to use bonuses in
order to exploit the manager’s overvaluation.
We summarize Section 6.2 in
Proposition 2 Shareholders’ risk-shifting incentives and the socially optimal bonus
If the manager is overconfident (i.e., θ > 0),
(i) capital requirements alone cannot implement the socially desirable bonus. The
bank’s bonus, zB|t=0 , is then always larger than the socially desirable bonus, zS|t=0 .
29Of course, an increase in capital requirements has other potential downsides (e.g. a decrease in
lending to firms) that are not dealt with in our model. See, for example, Van den Heuvel (2008) for
an analysis of the welfare costs of capital requirements.
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(ii) the bonus , zR|t=0 , of a bank that fully internalizes the government’s bailout costs
is always larger than the socially desirable bonus, zS|t=0 .
Proofs: Equation (31) and Appendix E.
A direct intervention into banker pay (e.g. bonus taxes or bonus caps) can however
implement the socially desirable bonus, as it addresses both motives for the excessive
use of the bonus at the same time. Direct interventions into banker pay not only tackle
the inefficiencies caused by incentives for excessive risk-taking, but also the adverse
effects arising from the manager’s overvaluation of the bonus. A bonus tax, for example,
increases the bank’s costs of the bonus relative to its costs of the fixed wage. Hence
the higher is the bonus tax, the lower is the incentive of the bank to save fixed wage
costs by offering an excessive bonus.30
Our results suggest that the EU bonus cap mitigates the socially adverse effects of
managerial overconfidence. This regulation became effective across the European Union
in 2014 as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV. The EU bonus cap limits
bonuses paid to senior managers and other ”material risk takers” in the financial sector
to 100% of their fixed salary (200 % with shareholder approval). Our analysis implies
that the bonus cap curbs the exploitation of managerial overvaluation, because it limits
the banks’ ability to lower compensation costs via higher bonuses and lower fixed wages.
Hence the EU bonus cap lowers excessive risk-taking in equilibrium.
More generally, Proposition 2 suggests that interventions into banker pay are part of
the optimal regulatory package for the banking industry. The existing literature has
identified competition for mobile bankers as the major reason to intervene directly into
banker compensation instead of only curbing shareholders’ risk-shifting incentives. For
example, Bannier et al. (2013) find that the competition for bankers with heterogeneous
and unobservable skill leads to excessive bonuses. This causes a level of risk-taking that
is not only excessive for society but also for the banks themselves. Thanassoulis (2012)
shows that the competition for bankers increases bankers’ pay, which gives rise to a
negative externality as rival banks have to increase banker remuneration as well. This
increase in banker pay drives up the remuneration costs of banks and thus their default
risk. Our finding in Proposition 2 adds to these findings by showing that bonuses in the
banking industry are excessive from a social point of view, even when competition for
30Of course Proposition 2 does not imply that interventions into banker pay should be the only
instrument in an optimal regulatory scheme.
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managerial talent in the banking sector is weak. This is because overconfidence creates
an incentive for banks to exploit managerial overvaluation.
7 Competition for overconfident bankers
In order to shed light on the competition for overconfident managers, this section intro-
duces hetereogeneities in bank characteristics and managerial overconfidence. Specif-
ically, we are interested in how government guarantees, bonus taxes, and capital re-
quirements affect the matching between banks and overconfident managers. Section 7.1
derives the equilibrium contracts and allocation when banks compete for an overcon-
fident manager. In Section 7.2 we analyze how this competitive equilibrium is affected
by heterogeneities in government guarantees, capital requirements, and bonus taxes.
7.1 Equilibrium contracts under competition
In this section, we introduce heterogeneities in bank characteristics and managerial
overconfidence. Specifically, there are two banks i ∈ (1, 2) that potentially differ in
the level of government guarantees vi, the bonus taxes ti, and the capital requirements
1 − si. There are two types of managers j ∈ (OC,N) that only differ in managerial
overconfidence θj. We assume that type OC, who we refer to as overconfident manager,
is more overconfident than typeN (θOC > θN ≥ 0), who we refer to as rational manager.
The two banks compete for the services of the overconfident manager via their com-
pensation packages. We assume that the overconfident manager is scarce (i.e., there is
only one overconfident manager) and that rational managers are abundant.31 Hence the
bank that does not hire the overconfident manager in equilibrium will hire a rational
manager instead. The manager j’s outside option to working for bank i is determined
by the contract that the other bank I (∀ i, I ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= I) offers to him.
As rational managers are abundant, the two banks do not compete for their services.
Hence the bonus and fixed wage of a rational manager in bank i, zi,N and Fi,N , are
the same as in the previous sections. Substituting the bank bonus from eq. (15) and
the fixed wage from eq. (16), we get bank i’s optimal profit when hiring the rational
31Our approach is thus similar to Gervais et al. (2011), who model the competition for a scarce















Y h + δvisid and Ψi,N = γ[2(1 + ti)− (1 + θN)]. (32)
It is easy to see from eq. (32) that bank i’s profit rises in the level of overconfidence. This
is because overconfidence increases effort- and risk-taking and reduces the compensa-
tion costs needed to convince the manager to work for the bank. Hence banks benefit
more from hiring an overconfident manager than from hiring a rational manager, and
compete for the services of the overconfident manager.
In equilibrium, the overconfident manager OC works for the bank i that is willing to
offer him his highest perceived utility. The maximum willingness to pay of bank i for









= Π∗i,N . (33)
Hence ûi,max is the level of OC’s perceived utility for which bank i is indifferent between
hiring him and hiring the rational manager N . Substituting Π∗i,N from eq. (32) and
solving for ûi,max, we get
ûi,max = ūN +
γΩ2i (1 + ti)(θOC − θN)
Ψi,OCΨi,N
. (34)
Eq. (34) determines in which bank the overconfident manager works. The bank with the
higher willingness to pay for the overconfident manager, ûi,max, hires the overconfident
manager in equilibrium. This willingness to pay rises in the exogenous outside option
of the rational manager ūN , and in the level of overconfidence of the overconfident
manager.
For the bank i that hires the overconfident manager in equilibrium, it is optimal to
offer this manager a contract for which he is indifferent between working for bank i
and the other bank I.32 This is given by
ûi,OC = ûI,max. (35)
Recall from eq. (8) that the perceived utility ûi,OC that manager OC derives from bank
i, depends on the bonus, zi,OC , and the fixed wage Fi,OC . As in previous sections, bank
32For simplicity, we assume here that if both banks offer the overconfident manager the same
perceived utility, he will decide to work for the bank with a higher maximum willingness to pay.
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i chooses the profit-maximizing bonus zi,OC given in eq. (15). The fixed wage is used
to attract the overconfident manager to work for bank i and thus adjusts to fulfill eq.
(35). Hence by substituting ûI,max from eq. (34) and the bonus from eq. (15), we get
the equilibrium wage of the overconfident manager
Fi,OC = ūN +








The first two terms capture the willingness to pay for the overconfident manager of
the bank I that loses the bidding war for the overconfident manager. The first term in
eq. (36), ūN , implies that the better the rational manager’s outside option, the more
expensive he will be for the bank and the more attractive is the overconfident manager
in comparison. The second term shows that the higher OC’s overconfidence, the more
valuable he is for the losing bank, which drives up his fixed wage in the bank that
hires him. Hence, due to the competition for his services, the overconfident manager
can now capture (some of) the rent that his overconfidence creates.33 Effectively, the
manager’s overconfidence commits him to exert more effort and risk, which generates
bank profits that he can (partly) capture under competition.34 The third term is the
perceived utility that the overconfident manager derives from the bonus in the bank he
works for. The higher this perceived utility from the bonus, the smaller the fixed wage
has to be in order to attract the overconfident manager.
To summarize, Section 7.1 shows that, in equilibrium, the banks’ contracts and the
managers’ allocation are given by
Lemma 1 Competitive equilibrium
In equilibrium, the bank i with the higher maximum willingness to pay,
ûi,max = ūN +
γΩ2i (1 + ti)(θOC − θN)
Ψi,OCΨi,N ,
33If the two banks are identical, then the overconfident manager captures the whole rent, Π∗i,OC −
Π∗i,N , of his excess overconfidence, θOC − θN . As under Bertrand Competition, the two banks will in
this case overbid each other until the banks’ profits for OC are just as low as the banks’ profits for
the rational manager. If the two banks differ (e.g in the level of the government guarantee vi), then
the overconfident manager will typically not be able to obtain the whole rent, because the losing bank
I is not willing to bid up his fixed wage until Π∗i,OC = Π
∗
i,N holds.
34Gervais et al. (2011) show, in a theoretical model, that a manager can actually benefit from his
overconfidence when firms compete for his services.
27
employs the overconfident manager with the bonus zi,OC in eq. (15) and the fixed wage
Fi,OC in eq. (36). The other bank I employs the rational manager with the bonus zI,N
in eq. (15) and the fixed wage FI,N in eq. (16).
In Section 7.2, we use Lemma 1 to see how the matching between overconfident man-
agers and banks depends on government guarantees, bonus taxes, and capital require-
ments. We can use the maximum willingness to pay, ûi,max, to determine how changes
in the exogeneous parameters affect the sorting of managers. If ûi,max, in equilibrium,
is an increasing function of an exogenous parameter, then the overconfident manager
will ceteris paribus work for the bank with a higher value of this exogenous parameter.
If ûi,max decreases in an exogenous parameter, then the bank with a higher value of
this paramter will ceteris paribus employ the rational manager.
7.2 Matching
This section analyzes the sorting of managers with respect to government guarantees,
capital requirements, and bonus taxes.35 The effect of the government guarantee on




2γ(1 + ti)(θOC − θN)Ωiδsid
Ψi,OCΨi,N
> 0. (37)
Eq. (37) shows that the maximum willingness to pay for the overconfident manager,
ûi,max, unambiguously increases in the level of government guarantees, vi. A bank with
higher government guarantees benefits more from excessive risk-taking as it can shift
more of the repayment costs to depositors, sd, onto the government. An overconfident
manager takes on more risk than a rational manager as he overestimates the success
probability of risky investments, and is thus especially attractive for banks that receive
large government guarantees. Hence the higher is the government guarantee of a bank,
the larger is the positive effect of overconfidence on the bank’s profit, which drives up
the willingness to pay for the overconfident manager, ûi,max.
From eq. (37) and Lemma 1, it follows that the overconfident manager ceteris paribus
works for the bank with a higher level of government guarantees in equilibrium. Lemma
1 also implies that the overconfident manager earns a higher bonus than the rational
manager. First, overconfidence makes the bonus more attractive for the bank. And
35Throughout this section we assume that the bonus tax is exogenously given.
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second, the overconfident manager works for the bank with a higher government guar-
antee, which has a higher risk appetite and accordingly sets a higher bonus.




= −2γ(1 + ti)(θOC − θN)Ωiδvid
Ψi,OCΨi,N
< 0. (38)
Eq. (38) implies that bank i’s willingness to pay for the overconfident manager is the
lower, the tighter are the capital requirements (i.e., the higher (1−si)). From the bank’s
perspective, overconfident managers have the advantage that they take on more risk and
that their risk-taking is cheaper to incentivize. Tighter capital requirements, however,
lower the shareholders’ risk appetite, as they imply that shareholders internalize a
larger share of the bank’s risk-taking. The shareholders’ lower risk appetite, induced
by tighter capital requirements, entails that the bank benefits less from employing an
overconfident manager. Hence, ceteris paribus, overconfident managers work for banks
with lax capital requirements.
Considering an exogeneous bonus tax, the effect of the bonus tax on the willingness to









Eq. (39) implies that, ceteris paribus, overconfident managers work for banks where
bonus taxes are relatively low. Note that the bonus tax is especially suitable to affect
the selection of overconfident managers. Like capital requirements, the bonus tax curbs
the bank’s incentive to shift risks, which decreases the benefit from employing an over-
confident manager. In addition, and unlike capital requirements, the bonus tax makes
it more costly for the bank to exploit the fact that an overconfident banker overval-
ues the bonus. Hence, if the government wants to avoid the selection of overconfident
managers into certain institutions, the bonus tax is a particularly effective tool to do
so.
We summarize our findings in
Proposition 3 Matching
The overconfident manager, OC, ceteris paribus works for the bank i with larger gov-
ernment guarantees vi, lower bonus taxes ti, and laxer capital requirements 1− si.
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The rational manager, N , ceteris paribus works for the other bank I with smaller
government guarantees vI , higher bonus taxes tI , and stricter capital requirements 1−sI .
Proof: Follows directly from equations (37), (38), (39), and Lemma 1.
The finding that overconfident managers select into banks with large government guar-
antees has significant implications for taxpayers. It causes equity and efficiency losses.
The selection of overconfident managers into institutions with large bailout guarantees
increases the likelihood of bailouts, pl∗, for two reasons. First, for a given contract,
overconfident managers take on more risk as they overestimate the success probabil-
ity of risky investments. And secondly, the bank creates higher powered compensation
contracts for overconfident managers, which amplifies the behavioral effects of overcon-
fidence and increases risk-taking further. The rise in the likelihood of bailouts increases
the bailout subsidy, B, and thus the transfer of taxpayer money to the bank and the
banker.
Beyond the direct bailout costs, B, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown that
there are large externalities both within the financial market as well as from financial
institutions to non-financial firms. A selection of overconfident managers, who increase
the default risk, into banks that are systemically important enough to receive govern-
ment guarantees is thus hazardous for the economy.
Proposition 3 suggests that a government can influence the selection of managers by
changing the bonus tax, ti, and/or changing the capital requirements, 1−si. Hence the
government can counteract the selection of overconfident managers into institutions
with large government guarantees. A bonus tax is particularly well suited to do so,
because it can tackle the exploitation of managerial overvaluation.
8 Discussion
This section briefly investigates some policy implications of our analysis. Section 8.1
discusses the international policy competition for mobile bankers. In Section 8.2 we
summarize why our model supports the implementation of bonus taxes in systemically
important financial institutions. Section 8.3 considers deferals and clawbacks of variable
renumeration and Section 8.4 briefly discusses the role of strong supervisory boards.
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8.1 International policy competition
Proposition 3 suggests that governments can affect the matching of managers with
banks by changing the bonus tax t and/or changing the capital requirements, 1−s. This
has implications for governments that compete for internationally mobile bankers.36 In
a non-cooperative setting of these two instruments, the governments can set high bonus
taxes or strict capital requirements in order to have a selection of rational bankers in
the domestic country. Conversely, if governments set low bonus taxes or lax capital
requirements, there will be a selection of overconfident bankers in the domestic coun-
try. These findings can be of interest to the literature on tax competition for mobile
bank managers (see e.g. Gietl and Haufler (2018)) and to the literature on regulatory
competition in capital requirements (see e.g. DellAriccia and Marquez (2006)), which
do not consider overconfidence.
Recall from Section 5.1 that overconfident managers create larger bailout costs, B,
but also generate greater tax revenue, T . Hence it is an interesting avenue for future
research to investigate under which conditions there is a ’race to the bottom’ or a ’race
to the top’ in bonus taxes when (some) bankers are overconfident. For example, it could
be rational for governments to attract overconfident bankers, if there is a joint liability
of bailout costs between the countries (i.e., a country partly comes up for the bailout
costs of another country and vice versa). In this case, governments can benefit from
the greater tax revenue that overconfident managers create, and only partly come up
for the larger domestic bailout costs that overconfident managers cause.
8.2 Bonus taxes and systemically important financial institu-
tions
Our model supports the implementation of bonus taxes in systemically important fi-
nancial institutions (SIFIs). In SIFIs, risk-shifting incentives, δvisd, are strong due to
explicit (e.g. due to deposit insurance) and implicit (e.g. because the SIFI is too big to
fail) government guarantees. The bonus tax can counteract these socially adverse incen-
tives. Hence the optimal bonus tax rises in the bank’s risk-shifting incentives (see eq.
(24)). As managerial overconfidence exacerbates the risk-shifting problem, the optimal
36There is ample evidence that bankers are mobile across countries (see e.g. Greve et al., 2009,
2015). For example, Staples (2008) shows that almost 70% of the 48 largest commercial banks have
one or more non-national board members.
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bonus tax further increases in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently
large (see Proposition 1). In banks with weak risk-shifting incentives, however, the op-
timal bonus tax should be lower in order not to deter the manager’s effort-taking. This
is especially the case if the manager is overconfident, because an overconfident banker’s
effort reacts more elastically to changes in the bonus tax.
Proposition 2 shows that direct interventions into banker pay are best suited to estab-
lish the socially optimal bonus if bankers are overconfident. Overconfidence creates an
incentive for the bank to exploit the managerial overvaluation of bonus payments. This
leads to socially excessive bonuses and excessive risk-taking. Unlike capital require-
ments, bonus taxes can counteract the bank’s incentive to exploit managerial overval-
uation and are thus able to deter excessive risk-taking. This is especially important in
systemically important financial institutions where the social costs from defaults are
large.
Proposition 3 shows that overconfident managers select into banks with large govern-
ment guarantees. This matching implies large bailout costs for taxpayers. Bonus taxes
are particularly well suited to counteract this selection. Like capital requirements, they
reduce the bank’s risk appetite and thus the benefit of employing an overconfident
banker. Unlike capital requirements, bonus taxes additionally tackle the exploitation
of managerial overvaluation, which further reduces the benefit of hiring an overcon-
fident manager. Hence Proposition 3, like Proposition 1, suggests that bonus taxes
should be larger in systemically important financial institutions than in institutions
that carry less systemic risk, albeit for different reasons. Bonus taxes should be higher
in SIFIs to mitigate excessive risk-taking (Proposition 1) and to deter the matching of
overconfident bankers and SIFIs (Proposition 3).
8.3 Deferred pay and clawbacks
Following the financial crisis of 2007-2009, several countries have considered and im-
plemented deferals and clawbacks of variable renumeration. In the United Kingdom,
for example, the variable pay of bankers is partly subject to deferral and clawbacks
for up to seven and ten years, respectively, from the date of a variable remuneration
award.37 This regulation aims to reduce excessive risk-taking in the banking industry
37See FCA PS 15/16 for details on the rules regarding bonus deferals and clawbacks for bankers in
the United Kingdom.
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by forcing bankers to internalize the costs of potential future losses. Thanassoulis and
Tanaka (2018) find that, in the presence of government guarantees, clawback rules can
establish socially optimal risk choices of a rational bank CEO.38 In their model, claw-
backs can discourage socially excessive risk-taking as they penalize the banker in case
of the bank’s default.39
Our analysis implies, however, that the effectiveness of deferred pay and clawbacks is
limited if the banker is overconfident (θ > 0). An overconfident banker underestimates
the probability of bank default (p̂l < pl). He thus underestimates any expected penalty
that he might incur in the case of default. Hence overconfidence deters the intended
effect of clawbacks and deferred pay to make the banker internalize downside risks.
8.4 Strong Boards
In recent years several papers have shown that better board supervision and monitor-
ing can attenuate the adverse effects of overconfidence on firm outcomes. Kolasinski
and Li (2013) show that strong boards help overconfident CEOs make better acquisi-
tion decisions. Banerjee et al. (2015) use the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act as an
exogenous shock in governance and find that it has improved operating performance
and market value for overconfident-CEO firms.
Our results show that the adverse social effects of managerial overconfidence cannot be
attenuated by strengthening boards, if risk-shifting incentives are strong (i.e., δvisd is
large). In systemically important financial institutions, a strong board has the incentive
to set excessively high bonuses for overconfident managers in order to exploit their
overvaluation and to induce them to take on excessive risks. Hence strong supervisory
boards can indeed benefit firm value in the presence of managerial overconfidence,
but they potentially create substantial welfare losses for taxpayers when risk-shifting
incentives are strong. Unlike strong boards, a bonus tax can curb the banks’ incentives
to exploit managerial overvaluation and it can deter socially excessive risk-taking.
38Thanassoulis and Tanaka (2018) emphasize that the clawback rules need to be assisted by rules
on the convexity of CEO pay. Otherwise the bank can adjust the CEOs renumeration to circumvent
the risk-reducing role of clawbacks.
39In a similar vein, Chaigneau (2013) suggests that a credible threat of sanctions for CEOs of failed
banks can curb risk-shifting incentives.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper we have incorporated managerial overconfidence and limited bank lia-
bility into a principal-agent model of the banking industry. Overconfident managers
overestimate the returns to effort and risk-taking, which implies that they exert more
effort and risk than rational managers. We find that the optimal bonus tax increases
as a response to managerial overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are strong. This
is because government guarantees create an externality of the bank’s behavior on tax-
payers, which is especially attractive to exploit, if the manager is overconfident. These
socially adverse incentives can be counteracted with a bonus tax.
Our model shows that overconfidence necessitates an intervention into bankers’ pay.
Curbing the risk-shifting incentives of shareholders (e.g. via capital requirements) alone
is not sufficient, as overconfidence leads to excessive bonuses even if shareholders fully
internalize the externalities of their risk-taking. This is because shareholders exploit the
fact that overconfident managers overestimate the probability of obtaining the bonus.
Hence shareholders have an incentive to increase their usage of bonuses to lower their
total compensation costs at the expense of the overconfident banker. The bonus tax
makes it more expensive for the bank to exploit managerial overvaluation and thus
reduces excessive risk-taking in equilibrium.
Finally, our model suggests that overconfident managers work for banks with large
government guarantees. These banks have a larger risk appetite and thus benefit more
from employing overconfident managers than banks with smaller government guar-
antees. Hence overconfident managers select into banks where they are particularly
detrimental for taxpayers. Bonus taxes are particularly well suited to counteract this
selection, as they not only curb the bank’s risk-taking incentive, but also make it more
costly for the bank to exploit an overconfident manager’s overvaluation of the bonus.
All in all, our model suggests that the presence of managerial overconfidence makes
bonus taxes in systemically important financial institutions necessary.
Our paper raises several questions for future research. For example, our prediction
that overconfident managers sort into banks (and, more generally, firms) according to
the regulatory environment could be empirically tested by using personal portfolios of
CEOs to determine overconfidence (as in Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Another promis-
ing research avenue is the international policy competition for mobile, overconfident
bankers. Our model shows that policy parameters such as bonus taxes and capital
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requirements affect the selection of overconfident and rational managers in a country.
Endogenizing such a policy parameter could shed light on whether it is optimal for
all countries to set strict regulation/taxation and drive out overconfident managers, or
if it’s actually optimal for some countries to have a high-risk banking sector run by
overconfident agents. We plan to cover this issue in future research.
Appendix
Appendix A. Bank’s maximization problem





Y h − z(1 + t)
]




(1 + θ)2z2 + F ≥ ū. (A.1)
Using the equilibrium probabilities from eq. (7), we get the following Lagrangian:
max
z,F
L =[γz(1 + θ)][Y h − z(1 + t)] + [pm0 −
β
µ
z(1 + θ)]Y m + [pl0 + δz(1 + θ)]visd
− F − d+ κ
[γ
2
(1 + θ)2z2 + F − ū
]
. (A.2)
As risk-taking is a mean-preserving spread, βY h = Y m holds. The three first order






Y h(1 + θ)− 2(1 + t)γz(1 + θ) + δvisd(1 + θ) + κγz(1 + θ)2 = 0, (A.3)
∂ L
∂F






(1 + θ)2z2 + F − ū ≥ 0. (A.5)
The bonus will always be used in equilibrium (z > 0) as the marginal costs of the bonus
at z=0 are zero, while the marginal benefits are positive due to the positive effect of
the bonus on effort- and risk-taking.
We focus on the case where the bonus and the fixed wage are used in equilibrium
(Case 1: z > 0 and F > 0). From the complementary slackness condition it follows
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that a positive fixed wage (F > 0) implies κ = 1 in eq. (A.4). Note also that for the
fixed wage to be used (F > 0), the participation constraint must be binding (i.e., eq.
(A.5) holds with equality). Otherwise profits could be increased by lowering the fixed
wage.
Solving eq. (A.3) for z and using κ = 1, we get the bank bonus zB in eq. (15). Using
the participation constraint in (A.5) gives the bank’s fixed wage FB in eq. (16). The
second order condition with respect to zB is given by
∂2L
∂z2
= −γ(1 + θ)[2(1 + t)− (1 + θ)]. (A.6)
In the two other possible cases, the fixed wage is not used. In Case 2 (z > 0, F = 0
and 0 < κ < 1) only the bonus is used and the participation constraint is binding.
In Case 3 (z > 0, F = 0 and κ = 0) only the bonus is used and the participation
constraint is not binding.
Analyzing the conditions under which κ = 0 and κ = 1, we can derive the conditions
for the three cases. Case 1 holds if overconfidence is sufficiently low:







,where Ω ≡ α
2
η
Y h + δvisd. (A.7)
Note that (A.7) implies that (1 + θ) < 2(1 + t), which ensures that there is an interior
solution for the bonus (cf. eq. (A.6)). We assume that the fixed wage is used for any
possible bonus tax (i.e., t ≥ 0). This assumption can be derived by setting t = 0 in eq.
(A.7), and is given in eq. (13).










. If overconfidence is very high,




, the participation constraint does not bind and Case 3 holds.
Appendix B. Optimal bonus tax
Substituting the bank’s bonus zB from eq. (15) and
∂zB
∂t






























{−2[Ω− λδvisd][2(1 + t)− (1 + θ)] + 2Ω(1 + θ) + (λ− 1)Ω[2− (1 + θ)− 2t]}. (B.2)
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Setting t = 0 and summarizing terms in eq. (B.2), we get the first order condition at
t = 0, as given in eq. (21).












= sgn{[2− (1 + θ)] [2λδvisd+ (λ− 1)Ω] + 4Ωθ + t[−2(1 + λ)Ω + 4λδvisd]}.
(B.3)
Eq. (B.3) shows that there is a corner solution (i.e., ∂W
∂t






(λ− 1) . (B.4)
This condition implies that the last term in squared brackets in eq. (B.3) is positive. As
all other terms in eq. (B.3) are positive as well, eq. (B.4) is thus a sufficient condition
for a corner solution. Intuitively, this condition shows that if the risk-shifting incentives,
δvisd, are very large, the government optimally chooses t
∗ → ∞ in order to minimize
its bailout costs.
If eq. (22) holds, however, then there is an interior solution for the optimal bonus tax.
Setting ∂W
∂t
in eq. (B.2) equal to zero, dividing both sides by (1+θ)γ
2Ω
Ψ3
, and solving for
t, we get the optimal bonus tax in eq. (23). It’s easy to show that eq. (22) implies that
∂W
∂t
> 0 for 0 6 t < t∗, and that ∂W
∂t
< 0 for t > t∗. Hence t∗ in eq. (23) is a global
maximum, if eq. (22) holds.
Appendix C. Effect of overconfidence on the optimal bonus tax
The effect of overconfidence on the optimal tax is negative, if and only if simultaneously
(i) the condition for an interior tax (cf. eq. (22)) holds, and (ii) the effect of θ on t∗ in
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For the effect of θ on t∗ to be negative in Case 1 (i.e., δvisd >
α2
η
Y h), (27) has to be
negative and simultaneously (C.1) has to hold. These two conditions hold simultane-
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.
This condition is satisfied for δvisd >
α2
η
Y h, if and only if δvisd < 3
α2
η
Y h. We have
thus proven that the effect of overconfidence on the optimal bonus tax can never be





Hence the effect of overconfidence on the optimal bonus tax is positive for any interior
solution of t∗, if (C.4) holds. Eq. (C.4) does hold for an interior solution of the optimal










which holds for a wide range of combinations of exogenous parameter values (e.g. it is
always fulfilled for (C.4), if λ is sufficiently close to 1).
To summarize,Case 1 proves that the effect of overconfidence on the optimal bonus tax
is positive for any interior optimal bonus tax, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently
strong (i.e., if eq. (C.4) holds). The strong risk-shifting incentives in (C.4) do not rule
out an interior optimal bonus tax as shown by (C.5).
Case 2
For the effect of θ on t∗ to be negative in Case 2 (i.e., δvisd <
α2
η
Y h), (27) has to
be negative and simultaneously (C.2) has to hold. For δvisd <
α2
η
Y h, the bonus tax is
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always finite (i.e., (C.2) always holds). Hence, the condition for a negative effect of θ
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Y h, (C.6) never holds if λ ≤ 2.5 and always holds if λ > 5. Hence a




Y h ∧ λ > 5. (C.7)
Appendix D. Socially optimal bonus
In the absence of bonus taxes, social welfare is the (weighted) sum of bank profit
Π∗ = ph∗(Y h − z) + pm∗Y m + pl∗visd − F − sd − (1 − s)d, actual manager utility




, and the weighted bailout costs λB = λpl∗visd.
The social planer’s maximization problem is then given by
max
z
W = Π∗ − λB + u






− (1− s)d− sd. (D.1)
Substituting eqs. (5), (6), and (7) into eq. (D.1), we get














γz2(1 + θ)2 − (1− s)d− sd. (D.2)
Deriving eq. (D.2) with respect to z gives
∂W
∂z
=γ(1 + θ)Y h − β
µ
(1 + θ)Y m − δ(1 + θ)visd(λ− 1)− γz(1 + θ)2. (D.3)
As risk-taking is a mean-preserving spread, we can use βY h = Y m. Setting (D.3) equal
to zero, and solving for z, we get the socially optimal bonus in eq. (28).
The second order condition is given by
∂2W
∂z2
= −γ(1 + θ)2 < 0. (D.4)
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Appendix E. Internalized risk-shifting incentives
We can derive the bonus of a bank that fully internalizes the government’s bailout costs
by adding the term −λpl∗visd to the bank profit in eq. (12). Setting t = 0, the bank’s
maximization problem is then given by
max
z,F
ΠR = ph∗(Y h − z) + pm∗Y m − F − (1− s)d+ pl∗visd− sd− λpl∗visd
s.t. ph∗ = γz(1 + θ)








(1 + θ)2z2 + F ≥ ū. (E.1)
Solving the maximization problem in (E.1), we get the bonus of a bank that fully
internalizes the government’s bailout costs
zR|t=0 =
Ω− λδvisd
γ[2− (1 + θ)] . (E.2)
Eq. (E.2) shows that the internalisation of bailout costs indeed reduces the bank’s
bonus, zR|t=0 . Comparing this bonus to the socially optimal bonus, we get
zR|t=0 − zS|t=0 =
Ω− λδvisd





γ[2− (1 + θ)](1 + θ) . (E.3)
It follows from eq. (E.3) that the bank’s bonus, zR|t=0 , equals the socially optimal
bonus, zS|t=0 , only if the manager is rational (θ = 0). If the manager is overconfident
θ > 0, the bank’s bonus will be higher than the socially optimal bonus. The reason is
analogous to the argument why capital requirements alone cannot achieve the socially
optimal bonus. If a bank internalizes the externalities of its risk-taking, then the bank
chooses a lower bonus in order to reduce bailout costs. If the manager is overconfident,
however, the participation constraint of a manager (cf. eq. (E.1)) provides an additional
incentive for the bank to choose an excessive bonus in order to save compensation costs.
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